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Using a case-study of General Motors’ Frigidaire division, this study shows that 
differences in market conditions for refrigerators and cars, together with the weaker 
asset specificity of dealers’ physical and other capital, made the opportunistic model 
used for its auto division impracticable for refrigerators. Frigidaire instead focused on 
developing symbiotic relationships, based on licensing not only the product and brand 
name, but also a sophisticated package of business services and training - to 
encourage dealer conformity and “buy-in” to their formal and informal control 
systems. Informal controls are shown to have been crucial to incentive alignment and 
knowledge transfer, underpinned by a vigorous socialization strategy, to build trust 
and social control and cohesion. This strategy succeeded in getting franchisees and 
their employees to view themselves as part of the Frigidaire organisation and created 
the necessary flexibility for Frigidaire’s network to rapidly respond to changing 





 Inter-war America witnessed a dramatic expansion in consumer durables diffusion, 
partly owing to manufacturers’ success in developing distribution systems that provided 
national market coverage. These typically involved “hybrid” business forms, between 
hierarchies and markets, mainly based on some variant of franchising. Franchising has been 
relatively neglected in the business history literature, with a few notable exceptions (e.g. 
Clarke, 2003; Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin, 2003; Tedlow, 1990). Meanwhile the business 
and management literature on franchising mainly dates from the late 1970s and is 
characterised by an evolutionary model involving two distinct franchise systems: 
“traditional” and “business format.” Traditional franchising involves a manufacturer 
franchising downstream activities to contractually-bound independent firms (typically 
retailers and/or distributors) which receive only rudimentary services from the franchisor. 
Then, more recently, the emergence of the “business format” franchising model is said to 
have introduced more comprehensive and sophisticated packages of business services for 
franchisees (Rubin, 1978; Lafontaine 1992; Lafontaine and Slade, 1997; Barthelemy, 2008).  
This study shows that even in the 1920s some franchising systems included the 
provision of sophisticated portfolios of business services (including training), using the 
example of General Motors’ Frigidaire division. Moreover, during this period Frigidaire 
developed systems and routines that overcame many of the problems identified in the modern 
franchising literature. For example, a vigorous socialization strategy was used to align 
franchisor and franchisee incentives, overcome the limitations of formal controls, and 
facilitate the transmission of tacit and complex knowledge. This strategy also increased the 
flexibility of Frigidaire’s network to respond to changing market or competitive conditions, 
without having to renegotiate formal contracts. 
The paper first provides a brief overview of the types of distribution systems 
developed by early consumer durables’ manufacturers and how these varied according to 
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product, market, and competitive conditions. It then explores why General Motors (GM) 
developed a radically different approach to franchising its refrigerators to the opportunistic 
strategy that of its auto division (Williamson: 1988; 1991; 2003). There follows an in-depth 
analysis of Frigidaire’s more symbiotic franchise system. The provision of business services 
and training, together with a strategy of socializing franchisee employees to identify as being 
members of the Frigidaire organization, are shown to have generated a level of retailer “buy-
in” that could not have been achieved solely using the coercive strategy of its auto division. 
Finally, the article discusses how Frigidaire’s strategy provided the flexibility to respond to 
changing market conditions during the 1930s.   
Alternative routes to achieving nationwide market coverage 
 There has been significant recent research on the distribution and marketing of inter-
war consumer durables, including automobiles (Clarke, 2003; Tedlow, 1990); radios (Scott 
and Walker, 2016); vacuums (Scott, 2019); and washing machines (Scott, forthcoming). In all 
cases the Chandler (1990: 28-31) model of ensuring high throughput through forward 
integration into distribution, to control the flow of outputs via managerial hierarchies, is not 
consistent with the actual methods used to keep sales in line with production. Instead, 
manufacturers generally developed hybrid forms, which substituted the “command 
relationship” of managerial hierarchies with long-term contractual relationships that provided 
incentives and credible threats to ensure dealer conformity (Lamoreaux, Raff, and Temin, 
2003, 405-7). 
 Vacuum cleaner firms, which were particularly reliant on home demonstration to sell 
their products, mainly used the “resale system”, pioneered by Hoover. Under this system 
door-to-door salesmen were nominally working for some local dealer, but were trained, 
supervised, and paid by the manufacturer. The store received a lower commission than the 
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typical price mark-up (15 percent, rather than the customary 33.3 percent), with the balance 
used to pay the salesman and his associated costs. The store’s role was limited to providing 
sales leads, allowing the salesman to demonstrate in-store and call on prospects using its 
name; stocking inventory; providing the retail credit; and undertaking local advertising 
(Scott, 2019, 323-4). Given that the salesmen were directly controlled by Hoover, its field 
staff, rather than the dealers they collaborated with, mainly managed the salesforce.  
 Washing machine and radio manufacturers typically selected strong independent 
retailers who were offered exclusive franchised territories. They were required to provide 
after-sales service and credit and participate in special promotions, local advertising, and 
door-to-door selling, while giving the manufacturer’s brand greater prominence than the 
others they stocked (particularly in radio, where exclusive representation was rare, as the 
public liked to see several different brands). Field sales forces were developed to monitor the 
franchisees, ensuring that they met the firm’s requirements and did not engage in practices 
such as price-cutting or infringing other retailers’ territories. They also incentivised dealers 
via co-operative advertising; promotions; competitions; assistance with instalment selling; 
subsidies for trade-ins; sales training and (for washers) sometimes provided door-to-door 
salesmen on the resale system (Scott and Walker 2016; Scott, forthcoming). 
 However, in some respects the refrigerator was a harder sell than these other durables. 
It was not suitable for home demonstration, had a close substitute (the ice box) and was 
substantially more expensive to buy and run than a vacuum, washer, or radio. Moreover, 
developing a refrigerator for home use which would not need frequent maintenance proved a 
very difficult technical task, delaying significant diffusion of mechanical refrigerators until 
the mid-1920s (see Figure 1). Rapidly achieving national market coverage, for an essentially 
“new” and very expensive product constituted a major challenge, which required the 
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development of particularly sophisticated franchise relationships, as the following case-study 
demonstrates. 
[Figure 1 near here] 
Methodology 
This paper is part of a broader study of the factors determining competitive success in 
the inter-war U.S. household durables sector (Scott, 2017; 2019; forthcoming; Scott and 
Walker, 2016). Frigidaire was chosen for this case-study as it was the refrigerator market 
leader; it used franchising as a key element of its expansion strategy; and it has bequeathed 
particularly rich and comprehensive archival resources (with an extensive archival collection 
at Kettering University, Flint, Michigan, together with a smaller archive at Wright State 
University, Dayton, Ohio). The Kettering archive provided particularly valuable information 
on all aspects of Frigidaire’s inter-war activities, with extensive documentation such as 
internal reports, marketing materials, communications with franchisees, inter-departmental 
correspondence, and strategic plans.  
In addition to triangulation between the extensive sources in the two Frigidaire 
archives, further triangulation was undertaken with four types of external sources, to mitigate 
potential problems arising from materials specifically selected for preservation by Frigidaire. 
These include: archival and other evidence regarding Frigidaire’s main rivals, GE and Serval; 
surviving archival evidence from other leading household durables firms, such as Easy 
Washing Machine Co. and Maytag, to examine the extent to which Frigidaire’s practices 
were typical of the broader sector; examination of every issue of the industry’s main trade 
journal,  Electrical Merchandising, for the period under discussion; and a systematic analysis 
of contemporary and historical secondary literature on Frigidaire and the wider household 
durables sector (including contemporary U.S. government investigations).  
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The following case broadly follows the “historical cognizance” approach, outlined by 
Kipping and Usdiken (2014: 543-3), in seeking to test and, potentially, modify theory through 
the use of a historical case, while also recognising the historical context of the case and the 
specific contingencies of the sector and its market. The analysis focuses on how the solutions 
Frigidaire developed suited the specific context of the refrigerator market, while not 
necessarily representing an ideal type solution for other durables with different market 
characteristics (Maclean, Harvey, and Clegg, 2017: 477; Perchard et. al., 2017).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
Frigidaire’s distribution system 
  Frigidaire was chosen for this company case-study as it was the inter-war refrigerator 
market leader and thus constitutes an “extreme case” (Flyberg, 2006) of enduring market 
success in household durables. Enduring success was by no means typical for household 
durables firms in this era; for example, three of the four leading radio manufacturers of the 
late 1920s failed to survive as significant players in the market by the mid-1930s (Scott, 
2017), while Frigidaire’s main rivals in the late 1920s, General Electric’s (GE’s) refrigerator 
department, and Servel, also experienced severe problems during the 1930s.1 Mechanical 
refrigerators constituted the most important household durable of the 1930s, with electrical 
refrigerators comprising some 40 percent of domestic electrical appliance sales by value 
(excluding lamps) in 1936.2 Frigidaire was both the household and commercial (i.e. 
commercial storage, shop refrigeration, etc.) refrigerator market leader for most years from 
the early 1920s to 1941. This article focuses on its household refrigerator sales. 
 Frigidaire has its origins in the personal acquisition of the struggling Guardian 
Refrigerator Co. by GM’s President, W.C. Durant, in 1918. Durant justified diversifying into 
refrigeration in terms of product synergies, “What are refrigerators but boxes with motors” 
(Gantz, 2015: 99). However, despite some limited R&D spillovers, strong synergies between 
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car and refrigerator production proved illusory. As GM President Alfred P. Sloan 
acknowledged in the early 1930s, Frigidaire “had nothing to do with the automobile industry” 
(Tedlow, 1990: 311). 
Critically, refrigerators lacked the strong technical economies that constituted 
impregnable barriers to entry in the volume car market. For example, when GE entered the 
domestic refrigerator market in 1927, the executive in charge of the project, T.K. Quinn, 
correctly estimated that they required an annual output of only 50,000 units to be price 
competitive with Frigidaire and its nearest rival, Kelvinator (Quinn, 1953: 88). Minimum 
efficient scale appears to have fallen substantially during the 1930s, owing to the 
standardisation of parts produced by third party suppliers, which led to considerable market 
entry, with some new entrants - such as Sears Roebuck - undercutting the prices of the 
leading brands (Anon. 1940: 104). Nevertheless, Frigidaire experienced strong long-term 
growth in both domestic refrigerator unit and dollar sales up to 1941 and remained the market 
leader (see Table 1), despite significant falls in market share during the price-wars of 1931-32 
and 1937-9 (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee, 1940: 131-4). 
[Table 1 near here] 
Frigidaire’s enduring success was partly based on high R&D investment, enabling it 
to develop new product “features” and more fundamental innovations, such as freon 
refrigerants. By 1941 Frigidaire had some 50 on-going research projects and an engineering 
staff of 280, 100 of whom worked full-time on product development (Anon., 1941). This 
R&D capacity also enabled Frigidaire to respond rapidly to competitors’ innovations. For 
example, the development of much quieter refrigerators, by Servel in 1926 and GE in 1927, 
was rapidly countered by Frigidaire’s 1928 introduction of the air-cooled compressor.3 
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While technical synergies with GM were relatively weak, Frigidaire had another, 
arguably more important, enduring competitive advantage, which was more closely linked to 
GM – an outstanding competence in marketing. Frigidaire’s ability to extend this marketing 
capability to its distributors and dealers, largely through mechanisms not specified in the 
franchise contract, was one of the key factors behind its success.  
GM’s interwar marketing techniques are regarded as having led the field in consumer 
durables (Clarke, 2003; Tedlow, 1990). Their Frigidaire project was originally run by R.H. 
Grant, a talented salesman who had previously worked as Sales Manager for National Cash 
Register, under John H. Patterson. Patterson was a legendary figure in durables marketing, 
having pioneered a model for speciality salesmanship which proved extremely influential in 
sales practice for many leading firms, including IBM and GM’s auto divisions (Friedman, 
2004: 117-150).4   
Like most of its principal competitors, and leading washing machine manufactures 
such as Maytag (Hoover and Hoover, 1993: 117), Frigidaire operated its distributorships and 
dealerships mainly via franchisees, who were allocated exclusive territories. Their 
distribution network essentially followed the vertical franchising system pioneered in the auto 
sector to achieve “control without ownership” (Tedlow, 1990: 145). This reflected the 
imperative to rapidly develop national market coverage to deter competitive entry, in what 
was originally perceived to be a highly oligopolistic sector. Under such conditions decision 
making has to take account of potential interactions with the strategies of rival firms 
(Fershtman and Judd, 1987; Slade, 1998). Moreover, according to Quinn (1953: 93-9) there 
was a tacit understanding among the large firms that price wars should be avoided. When, in 
1929, a local price-war did break out between Frigidaire and GE in Pittsburgh, it was rapidly 
settled by the senior executives of the two companies, leading to price “co-operation” 
between Frigidaire, G.E., Kelvinator, and – eventually – some other manufacturers. However, 
10 
 
this may have contributed to Frigidaire and the other big players being slow to react to price-
wars instigated by new entrants, which sometimes had a major short-term impact on the 
incumbents’ market shares. 
The resource scarcity approach notes that in sectors where national advertising and 
other scale-intensive assets are key determinants of success, franchising can assist in 
developing the critical resources required to reap scale economies (Carney and Gedajlovic, 
1991; Shane, 1996; Combs et. al., 2004a). One of franchising’s attractive features is that it 
overcomes the managerial capacity constraint on the limits to firm growth in sectors where 
rapidly gaining national market coverage is essential to achieving scale economies in areas 
such as marketing and distribution (Penrose, 1959; Shane, 1996). Tedlow (1990: 140 & 174) 
also argues that rapid development of national company-owned dealer networks would have 
been prohibitively expensive. 
The nature of household durables marketing provided a further imperative for 
franchising, given the importance of  “push selling”, typically by unsolicited door-to-door 
salesmen. Leading manufacturers marshalled large armies of salesmen; by 1938 Frigidaire’s 
national selling force numbered some 24,000.5 In the early 1920s this was a novel technique 
for selling consumer durables and therefore required close co-operation between Frigidaire 
and its retailers to disseminate scarce and largely tacit knowledge. Using franchising, rather 
than conventional manufacturer - distributor – retailer channels, also enabled durables 
manufacturers to specify and monitor standards of installation and after-sales service – 
reflecting what was to become a long-term pattern of franchising being concentrated in 
sectors with a substantial service element, delivered in proximity to the customer (Combs et. 
al., 2004a).  
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Frigidaire divided the USA into regions, each headed by a regional manager. These 
were in turn sub-divided into zones, comprising three or more district offices.  Each zone had 
an appliance and a commercial manager, a service representative, and a sales engineer. Then 
came the distributorships, their branches, and the dealerships, which were assigned exclusive 
territories and given responsibility for repair and maintenance services; stocking parts; 
recruiting, training, and supervising sales and service staff; and stocking and displaying an 
adequate product line.6 
Frigidaire originally intended to use only franchised distributors. However, some 
franchisees proved under-capitalised (a problem compounded by the highly seasonal nature 
of the household refrigerator trade, as shown in Figure 2). To solve this, franchised District 
Offices were supplemented by Frigidaire-owned distributors.7 In 1924 there were nine of 
these, together with around 40 franchised distributorships.8 The Depression necessitated an 
expansion of company-owned distributors, to maintain market coverage in territories where 
franchisees had gone into liquidation.9 Thus, contrary to Oxenfeldt and Kelly’s (1969) 
hypothesis that while firms may favour franchising during their early growth, over time 
franchisees would become restricted to marginal locations, in Frigidaire’s case such locations 
were more likely to be served by direct operations – owing to the imperative to maintain 
national market coverage. However, company-owned outlets proved extremely valuable in 
providing Frigidaire with direct expertise in all stages of distribution, from planning at 
headquarters to direct interactions with final customers.  
[Figure 2 near here] 
Both franchised and company-owned distributors ran their own retail operations, via 
salesmen operating from their district offices. Some districts also had sub-offices serving as 
retail outlets, when suitable dealers could not be found. Frigidaire also relaxed their exclusive 
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territory approach in larger cities, where the nature of the retail market (particularly strong 
customer patronage for certain key retailers) required a presence in a number of department, 
furniture, and other stores. A complex distribution hierarchy thus emerged, consisting, in 
1930, of 16 directly owned distributors and 34 franchised distributors, which in turn served 
48 “headquarters stores”, 34 sub-branches, 336 exclusive dealers, 4,390 non-exclusive 
dealers, 72 department stores, and 560 power company dealers.10  
While Frigidaire originally developed this mixed ownership/franchise approach to 
ensure national market coverage, some contemporary durables firms deliberately opened 
retail outlets with the sole purpose of gaining retail marketing expertise. For example, one of 
America’s largest washing machine manufacturers, Easy Washing Machine Co., operated 
fifteen retail stores across the USA by 1927, in order to provide expert advice to their 
franchised retailers: “They want to… know more about retail selling (through actual 
experience) than any Dealer they serve.” 11 
 
Frigidaire’s offer to its franchisees 
Studies of franchising in the early auto sector highlight substantial manufacturer 
opportunism, shifting costs (including the costs of mistakes, such as overproduction) onto 
dealers through leveraging the strong power imbalances between manufacturers and retailers 
(Clarke, 2003; Tedlow, 1990). Exclusive contracts (preventing the sale of rival brands), in a 
volume car sector comprising only three firms, meant that loss of the franchise typically 
resulted in liquidation for the dealership. Meanwhile the requirement for franchisee 
transaction-specific investments in auto dealership premises and plant, unsuitable for most 
alternative retail uses, imposed significant exit costs (Clarke, 2003). Both Ford and GM are 
found to have exploited their power over dealers, shifting costs to franchisees through 
13 
 
strategies such as shipping excess stock; sending models packed with unwanted accessories; 
and pressing dealers to use manufacturers’ finance facilities (Clarke, 2003; Tedlow, 1990). 
Conversely, Frigidaire dealers weren’t nearly so “locked-in” to their franchisor, 
making it impractical for Frigidaire to generate quasi-rents via such practices (Chassagnon, 
2014). Dealers’ key resources and capabilities (a staff of direct salesmen, centrally-located 
premises, and after-sales service skills) could be transferred either to one of the growing 
number of rival refrigerator manufacturers or to other durables, such as washing machines or 
radios. Moreover, many franchisees, such as power companies and appliance dealers, sold 
multiple product lines and could thus withstand the loss of their Frigidaire franchise. 
Frigidaire’s weaker bargaining power led it to pursue a very different franchising strategy 
than its GM parent, focusing on building symbiotic relationships. This was underpinned by 
heavy cumulative investments in sales and marketing assistance to franchised distributors and 
dealers, capitalising on activities which could be more efficiently developed centrally, owing 
to scale economies and/or firm-specific assets and capabilities. 
Frigidaire sought dealers who were well capitalised; had good standing in their 
community; experience in speciality selling; responsiveness to Frigidaire’s direction;  that 
could both handle salesmen and play fair with them; and who appreciated the importance of 
good after-sales service and sufficient display space.12 Once dealers were signed up, 
Frigidaire assisted them in organising installation and after-sales service; finding or training a 
sales supervisor; and hiring and training door-to-door salesmen.13   
Franchise agreements are relational contracts, with implicit and explicit rights and 
obligations, which set up incentives and define the boundaries of expected franchisee 
conformity and autonomy (Bradach, 1997). Frigidaire’s agreement was formally a discrete 
contract (dictated by the franchisor; Combs et. al. 2004b), but, as key elements of the 
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franchise relationship were not clearly specified, a significant relational element was also 
required. Frigidaire’s 1933 standard contract was a relatively short, five page, document, with 
27 clauses. It included a specified franchise territory, cancellable at any time by either party, 
with or without cause, and gave Frigidaire the right to change the size of the territory at will. 
The contract specified that Frigidaire was entitled to inspect the dealer’s place of business 
and audit their records and accounts.14 Dealers were obliged to maintain display facilities 
deemed satisfactory to Frigidaire and carry an adequate stock, while maintaining efficient 
installation and service facilities. They were also prevented from charging more than 
Frigidaire’s suggested installed prices.  
Rapid access to dealers’ financial data constituted a powerful formal control 
mechanism. Following the practice of their GM parent (Chandler, 1962: 145-153), Frigidaire 
required franchisees to report their stocks, sales, and installations, every 10 days. These 
figures both fed into Frigidaire’s production planning and benchmarked the outlet’s 
performance. As one branch manager told his colleagues in 1928, “In visiting dealer, the 
Branch Manager should go into detail as regards the dealer’s finances and profits and discuss 
it in a very frank manner.” However - despite being specified in the franchise contract – such 
monitoring was still socially embedded. He continued, “Fortunately I am close enough to 
most of the dealers… that I can walk into their office and go over the books and accounts… I 
want to know the inside story of that dealer’s … financial condition… whether he is making 
money or losing money and if he is, why? “15 
In 1930 statistical monitoring was extended to individual salesmen, via Frigidaire’s 
“Supervisory and Sales Activity Accounting Plan” for its  “metropolitan” dealers. This 
provided a practical method of comparing the relative efforts of salesmen within and across 
dealerships; determining man-power requirements; compiling information regarding the 
coverage of the dealer’s territory, and providing frequent sales, credit, and other data for 
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Frigidaire.16 This system compelled each level of management to regularly monitor the 
performance of its subordinate level, while generating the data required by head office and 
the branch/distributor using only three key forms.17 A simpler plan was introduced for 
Frigidaire’s “provincial” dealers in smaller towns, where limited local markets required 
selling Frigidaires alongside other merchandise. 
Modern franchise contracts typically include process/outcome controls such as field 
audits, automated management information systems, and mystery shoppers, to counter 
opportunism, or the withholding of information that might be useful to the chain (Akremi et. 
al., 2010). While Frigidaire’s contract included similar formal controls, one of the most 
interesting aspects of its system was the extension of control over activities not specified in 
the contract - an important aspect of franchising that remains relatively neglected (Ater and 
Rigbi, 2015).  
Codified knowledge management systems, such as Frigidaire’s dealer accounting 
system, typically struggle to capture more diverse knowledge and data that fall outside the 
system (Turner and Makhija, 2006). Two critical mechanisms for Frigidaire control over 
elements of the franchise relationship not codified in their contract were the development of 
an integrated array of services for its franchisees, together with socialisation mechanisms 
designed to boost trust and social control. These were deeply intertwined, as franchisees’ 
enthusiastic participation in the network’s marketing strategy relied on trust that it would 
raise profits both for Frigidaire and themselves. This was not axiomatic, as theory suggests 
that if dealers bear all the costs of their own promotional activities they will engage in less 
promotion expenditure than the manufacturer (who shares in the benefits) would find optimal  




Network knowledge transfer and incentive alignment 
The principal’s business practices have been identified as ranking second only to the 
brand name as the most important resources provided to franchisees (Barthelemy, 2008). 
Building on the marketing expertise of GM, Frigidaire rapidly developed an integrated 
marketing and sales strategy, largely based around the (then) novel method of direct, door-to-
door, selling. This constituted an effective, but problematic, sales strategy. Recruiting was 
difficult, as people looked down on direct sales work, while in the 1920s refrigerators were 
typically sold to prosperous white-collar families, thus requiring a “higher type of salesmen” 
than for vacuums or washing machines.18 Moreover, the industry faced an endemic problem 
of chronic salesforce turnover, estimated at 350 per cent for Frigidaire in 1929 - thus 
requiring 42,000 new recruits each year to maintain a salesforce of 12,000.19  
Frigidaire provided their franchisees with manuals and advice on how to attract and  
select door-to-door salesmen, while also organising national recruiting drives - such as the 
1933 “Everyman get a man” campaign, where salesmen were offered gifts in return for 
finding new recruits.20 Frigidaire also provided salesmen’s training, principally via training 
schools, sales literature, and personal coaching.21 The selling formula, broken down into a 
series of steps, essentially involved getting through the door; making an investigation of the 
household’s refrigeration arrangements, family size, financial position, etc.; making the sales 
pitch; returning in the evening to make a further pitch to the husband; and closing the sale.22  
Gaining entry to the home was facilitated by offering something of tangible value to 
the prospect. Vacuum salesmen offered to clean some of their carpets, while washer salesmen 
often offered to do the weekly washing (Scott, 2019; forthcoming). Refrigerator salesmen 
couldn’t offer such a service and Frigidaire thus armed them with small gifts, such as the 
“Magic Shopper” chart, showing the correct positioning of food in any type of mechanical or 
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ice refrigerator. This was a particularly useful “door-opener,” as the salesman had to see the 
customer’s (typically ice) fridge in order to know which chart it corresponded to.23  Another 
tactic was to claim the salesman was undertaking a “Home Economics Survey” for Frigidaire, 
which also enabled him to request personal details.24 Once inside, their inability to bring the 
refrigerator to the prospect’s home was overcome by using picture albums and an array of 
other “sales helps” for the demonstration. These even included a portable projector, for 
showing films regarding Frigidaire products, or the dangers of un/poorly-refrigerated food.25   
Frigidaire invested intensively in advertising and marketing, in co-operation with their 
franchisees. Early adverts focused on the health dangers of unrefrigerated food and ice 
refrigeration (which, they claimed, could not maintain a constant safe temperature). In the 
1930s, when the idea of mechanical refrigeration had gained consumer acceptance, there was 
a growing emphasis on convenience and money-saving benefits, together with the specific 
advantages of the Frigidaire brand. Conventional advertising ran alongside heavy investments 
in sales planning and direct mailings, as elements of a marketing strategy primarily based on 
supporting the door-to-door salesman.26  
Sales campaigns and materials were generated centrally. Contrary to the common 
modern franchisor practice of tying franchisees’ input purchases at above market prices 
(Rubin, 1978), Frigidaire generally paid at least part of the cost of the advertising and 
marketing materials and services offered to dealers, reflecting common practice for consumer 
durables’ manufacturers in this era (Scott and Walker, 2016). For example, Frigidaire 
provided a direct mailing service to dealers’ prospects, paying 78 percent of total costs.27 
Frigidaire also developed a Home Service organization from 1929, to create customer good-
will by providing participating  local dealerships with trained female demonstrators, who 
spoke to women’s clubs and educational bodies, while also developing and distributing recipe 
books and other customer literature.28  
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 In addition to on-going marketing activities, Frigidaire invested heavily in periodic 
special campaigns that relied on dealer participation. These included campaigns to sell 
refrigeration in winter (when demand what at its lowest, as many people used natural 
refrigeration, for example by putting food in their cellars), together with campaigns based on 
novel sales angles.29 For example, one particularly successful campaign, instituted in 1935, 
targeted lower-income families via the  “Meter-Ice Purchase Plan,” offering Frigidaires with 
no down payment and daily payments starting at only 15c for a basic model (deposited in a 
meter attached to the Frigidaire, which controlled its operation).30  
Getting franchisees to “buy in” to Frigidaire’s strategy involved aligning the dealers’ 
incentives with those of the company, while “selling” the advantages of their sales formula 
through a vigorous socialization strategy. Training and on-going “guidance” have been 
identified as important, if costly, mechanisms to achieve such alignment, especially for 
elements that could not be completely formalised in the contract (Hendry, 2002) while also 
constituting important channels for communicating knowledge and disseminating innovation. 
Training also played further important roles in socializing Frigidaire’s franchisees’ staff in 
the norms, expectations, and values of the franchise and in developing a consciousness that 
they were part of the wider Frigidaire organisation. As one branch manager put it, “We must 
have their confidence as well as the confidence of the dealer himself and they must be able to 
believe that they are a part of us and not working merely for a dealer.”31 Evidence suggests 
that this approach was successful. For example, a testimonial from a department store 
franchisee, The Outlet Store, Providence, Rhode Island, noted that their “Frigidaire 
Department feels that it is a part of two organisations. It is a part of the Outlet Store and a 
part of Frigidaire as well. The men consider themselves Frigidaire salesmen in every sense of 
the word.” 32  
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Psychological ties, strengthened through socialization strategies, have been identified 
as valuable channels for transferring complex forms of knowledge, especially where that 
knowledge is non-codified and/or concerns a series of interdependent components (Turner 
and Makhija, 2006; Hansen, 1999). Trust has been identified as an important control 
mechanism, mitigating opportunism and encouraging conformity to shared norms, cemented 
by socialisation processes, including formal social structures (Zucker, 1986; Bradach and 
Eccles, 1989;  Darr, Argote and Epple, 1995; Turner and Makhija, 2006). Such mechanisms 
can create shared values, attitudes, motivations and perceptions of common interests and goal 
congruence among the network’s staff, through rituals, ceremonies, and symbolic incentives 
as well as meetings and conventions (Turner and Makhija, 2006).  
Competitions, both between franchised dealerships and individual salesmen, 
constituted an important mechanism for creating an esprit de corps (Frigidaire’s standard 
policy being to pay half the costs of approved competitions). These cemented “franchisee 
cohesion,” defined as “franchisees’ inclinations to forge social bonds, help each other, and 
coordinate their efforts around the chain’s tasks and objectives” (Akremi, et. al., 2010: 933). 
By blending trust and social control, cohesion is said to mitigate franchisee opportunism and 
foster strongly shared values and norms, based around common interests (Akremi, et. al., 
2010).  
Competitions and their winners were trumpeted in Frigidaire bulletins to its 
franchised and directly-employed salesmen. These aimed to inspire greater sales, disseminate 
information on new sales techniques, keep salesmen up to date with various developments in 
Frigidaire products and methods, and inform them about new sales drives and competitions, 
together with celebrating their winners.33  Prize-winners received not only monetary 
incentives, but symbolic ones, such as membership of the “B.T.U. club” for outstanding 
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salesmen, who were each given a “diamond studded B.T.U. club pin” to mark them out as 
members of the sales elite.34  
Competitions and clubs were advertised, promoted, and celebrated in a series of 
bulletins and flyers, which also served to further develop employee loyalty, while reinforcing 
the image of the company as a community or “family” – in effect, “selling” the corporation to 
its workers (Brown, 2005: 138-9). For example,  Frigidaire Field News included reports on 
sales competitions, leading salesmen, conventions, and the achievements of the sales force, 
with substantial space being given to the names of salesmen who had won competitions or 
qualified for club membership.35 By discussing individual success in the context of the 
company’s internal culture and sense of community, they helped to strengthen corporate 
ideology (Biggart, 1989: 85). 
Sales conventions were also important channels for socialisation.36 Conventions 
typically mixed business presentations during the day and skits,  playlets, and lavish 
entertainment in the evenings, including episodes of “misrule”: ritual events during which 
workers subverted the hierarchy in controlled settings, such as the ridiculing of corporate 
aims and objectives (within controlled bounds) (Kwolek-Folland, 1994:161-2; Zunz, 1990, 
186). Misrule episodes also sometimes occurred spontaneously. For example, at one early 
regional Frigidaire convention, too much time was left between the business session and 
banquet and some drunken salesmen started trying to bomb the tables under the edge of the 
hall’s balcony with heavy glass water carafes (fortunately without injuries).37  
Such strategies were widely used by other sales-orientated firms (e.g. chain stores), 
but Frigidaire, together with some of its competitors, extended them to the staff of their 
franchised dealerships – effectively treating them as part of their organisation. Frigidaire’s 
managers were expected to take an active interest in all aspects of their franchised 
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dealerships’ management, to ensure that franchisees not only met financial objectives, but 
also maintained high levels of social cohesion. As one branch manager noted:  
It is our duty… to… keep the dealer organization `pepped’ up and in close contact 
with our company policies. In other words, we believe in looking upon a dealer 
organization in both sales and service, as though it were our own. Even though they 
are on the Dealer’s pay roll, we feel that we are more or less responsible for their 
creation and their existence and were we to leave it to the dealer to handle the 
meetings… the enthusiasm and `pep’ would very quickly ooze out.38  
 
Adapting strategy to a changing market 
 One potential disadvantage of franchises and other long-term relationships is that they 
can develop rigidities – becoming isolated from cost and efficiency pressures and making 
renegotiation in response to changing economic conditions more difficult (Lamoreaux, Raff, 
and Temin, 2003: 409). Frigidaire faced a major change in market conditions during the 
1930s, as the growing reliability and technological maturity of refrigerators transformed them 
from a specialist sales proposition to an item suitable for “over the counter” retailing. As a 
1935 Frigidaire internal report noted, “What began as a specialty business changed rapidly to 
a merchandising activity... It was a natural step for the merchandising type of store such as 
department stores, utilities, and furniture stores to sell electric refrigerators since many of 
them were already selling electric washers, ranges, and other household appliances.” 39 Such 
outlets accounted for 42.2 percent of Frigidaire’s total 1934 domestic refrigerator sales.40 
Frigidaire’s strategy of developing symbiotic relationships with franchisees proved 
particularly useful for this new generation of outlets, for which relying on economic muscle 
(Lamoreaux, 1998) to bring about compliance would be even less practicable than had been 
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the case for their earlier, more specialised, retailers. Frigidaire’s strategy towards these new 
outlets is illustrated by its department store policy. In 1932 Frigidaire established a 
Department Store Division and two years later it circulated a report showcasing the assistance 
provided to 43 department stores in 36 cities. Frigidaire’s proposition to these stores included 
not just its strong brand name, but, “Active cooperation through a retail-store-minded factory 
and field, which provides the necessary help in combining specialty selling practices with 
store merchandising methods.”41  
Frigidaire encouraged department stores to have a separate refrigeration department 
that could participate in its selling campaigns, managed by someone trained in speciality 
selling, who was exclusively devoted to hiring, training, and directing the sales personnel. 
Meanwhile the salesmen, typically on a straight 8-10 percent commission, should spend at 
least half their time calling at prospects’ homes (thus extending direct sales to department 
stores, which generally had no tradition of door-to-door selling). Frigidaire offered help with 
finding a competent specialist manager; supporting salesmen’s training; and providing a 
package of advice and assistance regarding finding sales leads, marketing campaigns, etc. 
Some stores were also provided with specialist Frigidaire demonstrators to help with weekly 
sales meetings, while many engaged in co-operative advertising with Frigidaire.42 This 
assistance appears to have boosted sales; a 1934 report claimed that department stores using 
direct sales methods (44% of  Frigidaire department store franchisees) had average 1933 sales 
of $40,000, while the remaining 56 percent had average sales of only $6,500.43   
Frigidaire also claimed that familiarity with their techniques provided positive 
spillovers with sales of the stores’ other appliances. Some 31 of the 43 featured stores were 
said to be using Frigidaire’s salesman’s supervisory system (both for Frigidaires and the other 
major appliances they stocked), “based on the fact that close supervision of the actual selling 
man in his sales activity is the only effective way to produce real results.” 44 Thus their 
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accumulated investment in supporting specialist dealers proved strongly transferrable to a 
new generation of franchisees, who sold refrigerators alongside a great many other lines, 
enabling Frigidaire to maintain its market lead in this changed environment. 
 
Conclusions 
 This study of Frigidaire’s distribution system, in the broader context of the inter-war 
U.S. durable goods sector, illustrates the contingent nature of the solutions employed, shaped 
by the characteristics of the product, the market, and competitive conditions (Perchard et. al., 
2017). Even within GM, two very different approaches to franchising were developed in the 
1920s, one based on opportunism (reflecting a concentrated market structure and the strong 
asset specificity of its dealerships) and another based on symbiotic relations – reflecting 
dealers’ stronger exit option, given that they could redeploy their physical and human capital 
to either another refrigerator brand or a different durable. Thus, in order to understand 
distribution systems for durables in this era – and the associated evolution of hybrid business 
forms – it is necessary to have multiple case-studies, capturing differences in product, market, 
and competitive conditions. Different solutions were even developed within the same product 
category; for example, in vacuums Hoover retained the resale system, while Electrolux 
successfully developed a system based on directly-employed salesmen, with no retailer 
participation (Scott, 2019).  
The Frigidaire case also illustrates the dangers of imposing a simple evolutionary 
franchising model, with an early phase of low services provision and an eventual shift to 
higher provision, without adequate historical evidence. Frigidaire developed many of the key 
techniques discussed in the modern franchising literature, to monitor franchisees, align 
franchisor and franchisee incentives, temper opportunism, transmit complex and tacit 
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knowledge; and foster “buy-in” on the part of dealers and their employees. This system, 
based on extensive provision of business services and training, constituted a key transferrable 
competency that boosted the efficiency of Frigidaire’s network - using Frigidaire’s scale 
advantages to generate services such as sales planning, training, advertising, and market 
research, that could not be efficiently provided by individual retailers.  It is not clear whether 
the key interdependencies that constituted the Frigidaire network’s “system” – door-to-door 
selling supported by heavy advertising and planning; building symbiotic relationships with 
franchised distributors and retailers; developing strong, transferable competencies based 
around its selling strategy; and cementing dealer buy-in via a vigorous socialization strategy 
– were consciously planned or simply emerged in response to early challenges. However, all 
the key elements were in place by the late 1920s and constituted Frigidaire’s basic selling 
system for the rest of the inter-war era.  
 Finally, this study casts doubt on the imperative for vertical integration during the 
early twentieth century, to coordinate throughput; develop efficient sales, consumer credit, 
after-sales service and similar downstream activities; and effectively respond to changing 
market and competitive conditions (Chandler, 1990: 28-31). It shows that that hybrid 
structures can fulfil all these functions, both in static and dynamic contexts, if networks are 
based on essentially relational, rather than formal, contracts. Frigidaire was able to adapt its 
franchising model during the 1930s, to meet the needs of a market that was progressively 
more focused on over-the-counter sales by department stores and other general retailers. This 
contrasts sharply with the experience of Hoover, a more integrated firm – managing its own 
sales force - which rejected consultants’ advice to renegotiate their contracts with retailers on 
the basis of a lower commission (reflecting the declining importance of retailer services), to 
combat the competitive threat from Electrolux’s lower-cost distribution system (Scott, 2019).  
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While Hoover’s relationships with its retailers had become progressively formalised 
and arms-length (as the selling task was essentially conducted by Hoover), Frigidaire had 
maintained strong informal relations with its distributors and retailers, underpinned by the 
provision of services and training, together with a strong socialization strategy to “sell” its 
policies to its network, through building trust and social control and cohesion. This again 
reflects the importance of not treating hybrid business forms as a homogenous group, but 
instead focusing on the particular formal and informal controls and incentives employed, 
together with their implications for both static functionality and dynamic flexibility. 
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Table 1: Frigidaire household refrigerator sales and market share, 1926-1941 
Year       Frigidiaire sales  % of national unit sales
Units $ (million) Electrical Mechanical
1926 70,071 25 n.a. 30.5
1927 117,046 47 n.a. 28.2
1928 163,937 47 n.a. 27.8
1929 308,733  77 39.7 37.3
1930 207,703  55 26.3 24.3
1931 227,823  53 25.1 23.0
1932 174,085  33 21.8 19.4
1933 224,246  40 22.1 18.7
1934 242,325  45 18.9 17.3
1935 300,976  52 19.2 17.4
1936 443,940  77 22.3 20.2
1937 503,574  94 21.8 19.6
1938 259,103  48 20.7 18.0
1939 338,259  61 17.8 15.8
1940 621,730  91 23.9 21.7
1941 722,397  112 20.6 19.0  
Sources: years 1926-28, Kettering, Frigidaire, 79.10.1.164, `Frigidaire and industry unit sales 
1926-54’, (n.d., c. 1955); 1929-41, ibid, 79.10.1.41A, statistical tables for T. R. Shellworth, 
`Report on Frigidaire’s Development’, (1950), statistical tables, p. 24. 
 











Figure 1: Diffusion of electric washing machines, vacuums, and refrigerators, 1922-1940 
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Source: Anon, 1972.  
Notes: Data exclude second-hand sales (except for machines reconditioned and re-sold by 
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